The development and design of financial incentive schemes as a sustainable and cost-effective intervention strategy to foster effectiveness of medical interventions remains a significant challenge in health care delivery. Based on the findings of the conceptual model of medical non-persistence we test three different financial incentive schemes. These incentives are derived upon concepts of behavioral economics, in particular mental accounting, prospect theory and choice bracketing, and incorporated into deposit, copayment and bonus schemes. We conduct randomized laboratory experiments to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of each incentive scheme on persistence behavior under controlled conditions. Participants in the experiment are students remunerated according to their performance in the experiment.
The development and design of financial incentive schemes as a sustainable and cost-effective intervention strategy to foster effectiveness of medical interventions remains a significant challenge in health care delivery. Based on the findings of the conceptual model of medical non-persistence we test three different financial incentive schemes. These incentives are derived upon concepts of behavioral economics, in particular mental accounting, prospect theory and choice bracketing, and incorporated into deposit, copayment and bonus schemes. We conduct randomized laboratory experiments to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of each incentive scheme on persistence behavior under controlled conditions. Participants in the experiment are students remunerated according to their performance in the experiment.
We find that financial incentive schemes based on the principles of prospect theory significantly improve treatment persistence compared to the situation where there are no incentives at all. This finding implies that the simple but smart reallocation of co-payments and co-payment support between the treatment initiation phase and treatment maintenance phase represents an effective way of promoting persistence behavior. This study delivers first applications of behavioral interventions based on theoretical foundation. Using the method of experimental economics the study serves as a first proof of concept of a scalable way to design, calibrate and test the effectiveness of financial incentives on behavioral change. This approach is inevitable for broad application in real world as it minimizes the need for patient research while clarifying the impact of interventions under controlled conditions before these interventions get implemented in the field.
Introduction
With flattening and partially shrinking healthcare budgets and the aim to increase coverage, 1 quality and services, improving health care delivery efficiency and effectiveness is central in 2 health care decision making. Providers of care as well as health care services and products are 3 increasingly being held accountable for delivering health outcomes (effectiveness). But the 4 health care delivery value chain is complex. It includes suppliers like pharmaceutical 5 manufacturers, providers like hospitals and physicians as well as patients as "prosumers" (co-6 producers). Thus the efficiency and effectiveness of health care delivery is highly dependent on 7 patient's behavior. Not surprisingly the next major cycle of improvements in health outcomes 8 is seen as not only being driven by new clinical science, but by behavioral change. More and 9 more emphasis is on gathering evidence to identify the interventions that are most effective at 10 improving health outcomes, and then realigning the behaviors of all stakeholders -patients, 11
providers, manufacturers and others -around these interventions. 12
One of the suboptimal behavioral patterns of striking magnitude and thus barrier to efficiency 13 of health care delivery and achievements of desired levels of health outcomes is poor medical 14 persistence to long-term therapy. In particular, there are two reasons why the appropriate development and design of financial 21 incentive schemes as a sustainable and cost-effective intervention strategy to improve 22 persistence behavior remains a significant challenge for health care research: 23 1) Standard economic cost-benefit models assume a patient who responds to incentives in a 24 rational way. Yet, findings from behavioral economics which integrates the fields of economics 25 and psychology suggest that patients fail to make behavioral changes and have predictable 1 biases that affect the decision-making with recommended medication usage (Asch et The aim of the study is to design 1) financial incentive schemes build on principles of behavioral 12 economics to better describe and address patient decision-making biases in health contexts and 13 to use 2) behavioural laboratory experiments as a scalable way to evaluate the performance of 14 the financial schemes. In particular, the design of our three financial incentive schemes are 15 based on the behavioral concepts of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985 (Thaler, , 1999 , prospect theory 16 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and choice bracketing (Read et al., 1999) . Using the method of 17 experimental economics, each financial incentive scheme is tested in a series of randomized 18 laboratory experiments with student participants allowing for clean causal inferences about the 19 performance of one single incentive scheme on improving persistence. By incorporating the 20 main features of a stylized medical treatment into an experimental setting, our approach follows 21 the procedure of behavioral economic engineering studies in management science (Bolton et  22 al., 2013). Thereby, behavioral economic engineering denotes the science of designing real-23 world institutions and mechanisms that align financial incentives and patient behavior with the 24 underlying goal of improving persistence (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2012; Roth, 2002). It offers a 25 method to investigate how patients react to different kinds of financial incentives under 1 controlled conditions prior to the institution's launch on a large social scale. We proceed as 2 follows. In a first step we briefly describe the conceptual framework of medical non-persistence 3 by Djawadi et al. (Djawadi and Fahr, R., Turk, R., 2014) which serves as the theoretical 4 foundation to derive the mechanisms of our financial incentive schemes. In a second step, we 5 illustrate how we designed a randomized economic experiment to test the performance of each 6 financial incentive scheme under controlled conditions and present the behavioral results. 7
Methods 8

Conceptual Framework of medication persistence 9
We use the conceptual framework of medical non-persistence by Djawadi et al. (Djawadi and  10 Fahr, R., Turk, R., 2014) to derive and design the mechanisms of our financial incentive 11 schemes. The framework explains medical non-persistence from the perspective of behavioral 12 economics to understand patient's preferences for discontinuing with therapy over time. any improvements because a certain time and a certain threshold level are needed for the 19 medicine to reach plateau efficacy ("on" characteristics of drug). After this threshold level is 20 met, patients are observed to comply extremely well ("phase of high persistence"), yet fail to 21 do so at a specific point in time and then start discontinuing with therapy ("phase of expected 22 variation in persistence behavior"). In order to reflect the three typical persistence phases in 23 medical treatments and to account for possible dynamic inconsistencies in patient preferences 24 over time, the patient's decision-making process is assumed to follow the principles of mental 25 accounting (Thaler, 1985 (Thaler, , 1999 . The framing of the outcomes of continuing with therapy in 1 terms of gains and losses follows the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The 2 predictions of the conceptual framework were validated using the method of experimental 3 economics. The experiments show that a subject's perceptions about economic gains and losses 4 of continuing with therapy change over the course of a treatment, causing a switch to non-5 persistence at a particular point in time. Subjects keep choosing the option with lower risk until 6 the experienced losses are compensated. Consistent with the predictions of the conceptual 7 model and opposed to rational choice behavior, once the losses are evened out, subjects value 8 any further economic gains of continuing with therapy to a much smaller extent and 9 consequently reveal preferences for the more risky choice of discontinuing with therapy until 10 the end of the treatment. 11
Engineering and Testing the Performance of Financial Incentive Schemes 12
Based on the empirical findings of the conceptual framework of Djawadi et al. (Djawadi and  13 Fahr, R., Turk, R., 2014) and on broad empirical evidence that people suffer from systematic 14 biases in medical decision-making, reacting to incentives differently than proposed by rational 15 choice theory, we include and tailor concepts from behavioral economics into our financial 16 interventions to enable a behavioral change. To empirically evaluate the performance of each 17 financial incentive scheme we proceed as follows: we use the exact experiment of Djawadi et The second financial incentive scheme COPAYMENT aims to reduce the costs of being 19 persistent by lowering copayments for obtained medicines. This experimental intervention 20 considers the diminishing effect of future gains over time which is predicted by the value 21 function of the conceptual framework. As future gains are valued less when individuals have 22 compensated all their previous losses, lowering the costs associated with being persistent in 23 the domain of gains makes persistence behavior more attractive for subjects. The increase in 24 utility obtained from this choice is the least risky option, so that it is expected that fewer 25 subjects compared to BASE will switch to non-persistence. Our second hypothesis is 1 In the third financial incentive scheme BONUS we make bonus payments to patients. 
BASE. 2
To clearly measure the effect of the financial incentive schemes on observed persistence 3 behavior, it is crucial to disentangle the 'incentive-effect' from other effects which possibly 4 play a role in the individual's decision-making process. Since the decisions are to be made 5 under risk and uncertainty, the attitude towards risk is a crucial aspect that must be accounted to elicit risk preferences on a valid basis. Our last hypothesis is: 18
H-RISK: More risk-seeking individuals will tend to switch earlier from continuing with 19
therapy to discontinuing with therapy compared to their more risk-averse counterparts. 20
21
Experimental Design 22
We firstly present the experimental design of BASE in detail and then describe which 23 parameters we calibrated to test the performance of each proposed financial incentive scheme. 24
The original experiment is designed as a simple investment game and creates an economic 25 environment which is equivalent to a medical treatment (see Figure 1) . Subjects decide in an 1 investment plan over several decision periods between two investment options: lottery A and 2 lottery B. These lotteries represent the economic consequences of continuing with therapy as a 3 trade-off between benefits and costs, and capture the entailed risk of suffering a non-4 compensable medical relapse. To simulate the course of events inherent in medical treatments 5 from an economics perspective, prior to the investment plan the experiment starts with a 6 working stage. The working stage is the economic equivalent of the "phase of invasion" and is 7 intended to incur costs for the subjects. Subjects work in the laboratory by exerting a real effort 8 task which is known in the literature as the slider task (Gill and Prowse, 2012). A screenshot 9 of the slider task is provided in Appendix A. In the slider task, subjects position tiny sliders on 10 the computer screen which requires both effort and time. Subjects get to know how much money 11 the completion of the slider task is worth, but they are only provided with a fraction of this 12 amount. Hence, comparable to patients in medical treatments, subjects in the beginning of the 13 experiment invest effort and endure a loss of foregone benefits, in this case monetary payoffs, 14 when they start the investment plan. 15 In each decision period of the investment plan, the subject can choose between lottery A and 19 lottery B respectively. While each lottery has the same payoff structure, they differ in their risk 20 profile of receiving the positive outcome. Lottery A is the more and lottery B is the less risky 21 lottery. In order to play the less risky lottery B subjects have to invest a certain amount of 22 money, i.e. the choice of the less risky option entails costs but increases the chance of receiving 23 the positive outcome. The monetary costs when playing lottery B correspond to costs of 24 persistence behavior in a medical treatment (for example opportunity costs, costs in form of 25 side effects or complex intake procedures). Lottery A represents non-persistence behavior and 1 comes with no costs. Once the subject makes a choice between the two lotteries a randomization 2 device determines whether the lottery was won or lost according to the probabilities that are 3 associated with each outcome of the chosen lottery. Depending on the choices, the subject has 4 the possibility to compensate his/her losses from the working stage and increase the individual 5 wealth to a substantial positive amount. A crucial feature of the experiment is the "sudden death 6 mechanism". Once the subject loses the lottery the subject cannot take any further decisions in 7 the experiment. It is noteworthy that both lotteries may lead to a drop out, but the probability 8 for a drop out is far larger in lottery A, in particular when choosing lottery A repeatedly. This 9 feature closely corresponds to a medical treatment. If patients partially or completely stop 10 taking their medication as prescribed, they will soon drop below the threshold level of the 11 substance being efficacious ("off" characteristics respectively duration of action of drug). If the 12 threshold level is not reached, the risk for a relapse increases. 13
Calibration of Experimental Parameters 14
We calibrate the relevant parameters in the three experimental treatments with financial 15 incentives (DEPOSIT, COPAYMENT and BONUS) as follows. 16
The working stage is identical for every single treatment. Subjects have no time limit for 17 working on the slider task and only when all 48 sliders are positioned correctly the task is 18
completed. This task is worth 8 units of the experimental currency Taler, but the subjects have 19 to pay 6 Taler in order to enter the next stage. Thus, each subject starts the investment plan with 20 a loss of 6 Taler. 21
The investment plan consists of at most 12 periods. In each period, the subjects have to choose 22 between lottery A and B which both yield either 2 Taler or 0 Taler. A screenshot of the choice 23 display is reproduced in Appendix A. In lottery A, the chance of winning 2 Taler occurs with a 24 probability of 70% and of losing, i.e. getting nothing, with a probability of 30%. In lottery B, 25 the chance of winning 2 Taler occurs with a probability of 95% and of losing the lottery with a 1 probability of 5%. However, in order to be able to play the less risky lottery B, the subject has 2 to invest 1 Taler. In the case of winning the selected lottery, the subject is able to choose 3 between the two lotteries once again in the following period. The monetary earnings of the 4 chosen lotteries are accumulated over the periods. When a subject loses the lottery, he is not 5 able to make any further decisions. The current account balance remains unchanged until the 6 end of the experiment. The outcomes and the corresponding probabilities of the two lotteries 7 are chosen in a way that the strategy for maximizing expected value in all experimental 8 intervention treatments is to choose lottery B in the periods 1 until 11 and then switch to lottery 9
A for the last period 12. The detailed calculation can be found in Appendix B. Hence, in analogy 10 of a medical treatment, subjects have a higher probability of maintaining their current health 11 status without suffering a relapse if they comply. In our framework this means constantly 12 choosing lottery B throughout the decision sequence. 13
The three financial incentive schemes differ with respect to the timing at which subjects 14 compensate their losses over the course of the experiment. In DEPOSIT, for each decision in 15 the periods 1 to 6, subjects are required to pay an additional amount of 0.5 Taler which is paid 16 back to them step by step in the subsequent periods 7 to 12. Thus, subjects can compensate their 17 previous losses from the "phase of invasion" in period 9 at the latest. In COPAYMENT, the 18 cost to play lottery B is decreased by 20% from 1 Taler to 0.8 Taler in periods 7 to 12. In these 19 periods, subjects are in the domain of gains if they constantly choose lottery B and have not 20 lost a lottery in a previous period. Finally, in BONUS, the subjects are credited a bonus payment 21 amounting to 0.5 Taler after every third period, i.e. in periods 3, 6, 9 and 12. All the payments 22 are only provided when subjects are still able to decide between the two lotteries and have not 23 lost a lottery in a previous period. 24
Experimental Procedure 25
The experiment was conducted in September 2011, July 2012 and October 2012 in the 1
Economic Experimental Laboratory at a middle-sized European University. Subjects were 2 recruited by the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) from a pool of approx. 1,800 3 voluntary students from different fields of study, who are enrolled as prospective participants 4 in economic experiments. In total, 12 sessions were conducted with four sessions for each of 5 the three financial incentive treatments, respectively. All in all, 322 subjects participated with 6 102 subjects in DEPOSIT, 110 subjects in COPAYMENT and 110 subjects in BONUS, 7
respectively. Participation was restricted to one session only. The experiment was programmed 8 and conducted with the software zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) . As soon as the subjects arrived at 9 the Lab, they were asked to randomly draw a number from a box and were told to sit down at 10 the assigned computer workplace in a cubicle detached from each other ensuring complete 11
anonymity. In each session, the subjects received the same introductory talk and were told not 12 to communicate during the complete session. Then, the written instructions were handed out 13 and the subjects had ten minutes time to read them and ask questions in private to clarify any 14 misunderstandings. The instructions of the original experiment BASE and the experimental 15 treatments DEPOSIT, COPAYMENT and BONUS can be found in Appendix C. The 16 instructions were written in a context-free manner so that no associations with medical 17 treatments, drug intake etc. could emerge which might influence subjects' decisions in an 18 uncontrolled way. In the instructions, subjects were assured that all decisions were made 19 anonymously, so that neither the experimenter nor other participants got to know the identity 20 of the subject who made a specific decision. Each subject had to decide solely for herself and 21
was not informed about the decisions of others. Furthermore, the subjects were informed that 22 their payoff was given to them anonymously and that their payoff did not depend on the 23 decisions of the other subjects. At the end of the experiment, the subjects were asked to fill out 24 a questionnaire which consisted of two parts. In the first part, risk preferences were elicited 25 using an incentivized version of the lottery choice framework by Dohmen et al. (2010) followed 1 by an unpaid second part where subjects were asked questions mainly about their socio-2 economic background such as age, gender and field of study. Each session lasted for about one 3 hour and subjects earned on average 10.58 Taler. At the end of each experimental session, the 4 amount of Taler was converted into Euro and paid to subjects along with a show-up fee of 5 €2.50, so that on average subjects received approximately €18.50 (roughly 23 USD at that time). 6 7
Results 8
Descriptive Statistics 9 Table 1 shows the distribution of choices concerning the lotteries A and B and the 10 corresponding drop-out and "survival" rates for different periods for all financial intervention 11 treatments. Of the 322 subjects who participated in one of the three treatments, the vast majority 12 of roughly 80% started with lottery B in the first period of the investment plan after completing 13 the slider task in the working stage. Considering that the risk of dropping out of the experiment 14 accumulates with each further decision, the choice of lottery B in all but the last period serves 15 as a dominating strategy for risk-neutral agents with the aim to maximize their payoff in the 16 experiment. The latter requires staying in the experiment for as long as possible. In fact, when 17 lottery B was chosen, the average rate of dropping out of the experiment at any of the 12 18 decisions was 67.44% compared with a drop-out rate of 89.00% when subjects started with 19 lottery A. Looking at this result from the opposite perspective and thus determining how many 20 subjects on average were able to make a choice up to the periods 3, 6, 9 and 12, we see that 21 subjects who constantly chose lottery B had a higher chance of winning the lotteries and staying 22 in the experiment longer than those subjects who opted for lottery A. The average survival rate 23 over the periods keeps decreasing in steps of roughly 25% for subjects who play lottery A, 24 whereas lottery B players on average had a 16% higher chance of surviving these periods. 25
Roughly 32% of subjects who started with lottery B won all the 12 consecutive lotteries 1 compared with only 11% of subjects who started with lottery A. Similar to the findings reported 2 in Djawadi et al. (Djawadi and Fahr, R., Turk, R., 2014) the observed behavioral pattern of each 3 experimental treatment does not follow rational choice theory. As can been seen from Table 1  4 only a fraction of subjects chooses the lotteries according to rational choice theory. Rather, the 5 majority of subjects either switch far earlier to lottery A or stay longer with lottery B, supporting 6 the conjecture that judgment biases lead to deviations from choice behavior predicted by 7 standard economic theory. 8 Table 1 : Summary statistics about the distribution of the lottery choices A (equivalent to non-persistent behavior) and B
9
(equivalent to persistent behavior) with corresponding drop-out and survival rates. Percentage of subjects switching from B to 10 A according to rational choice theory.
12
<Insert Table 1 about here>  13 14 15  16 We compare the persistence rate curve of BASE with the corresponding curves of DEPOSIT, 17
Comparison of Persistence Behavior
COPAYMENT and BONUS respectively. We define the persistence rate as the ratio of lottery In fact, 91% (88%, 92%, 94%) of subjects starting with lottery B in BASE (DEPOSIT, 24 COPAYMENT, BONUS) switch at most once to lottery A and keep choosing this option either 25 until they drop out of the experiment or until the end of the investment plan. The idea is that 26 these subjects correspond to patients who agreed upon medical treatment in the beginning and 27 might discontinue with therapy until the end of the medical treatment. As subjects can drop out 28 of the experiment when losing a lottery, not all individual decisions can be observed throughout 29 the 12 periods. We therefore determine the potential difference in persistence by using the Log-1 Rank Test which is commonly used in survival analysis when censored data are present (Lee 2 and Wang, 1992). As can been seen in Figure 2 , persistence rates are higher in DEPOSIT compared to BASE only 9 after period 8. This finding indicates that a higher proportion of subjects switched earlier to 10 lottery A compared to BASE when they were in the domain of losses. As soon as the losses 11
were compensated in period 9, the additional bonus of 0.5 Taler led the remaining subjects to 12 comply more compared to BASE until the end of the time horizon. Thus, we do not find any 13 statistical difference in persistence behavior between DEPOSIT and BASE over all periods 14 (Log-Rank Test Chi-Square value: 0.30, 1-sided, p=0.293). Therefore, we cannot support our 15 first hypothesis that extending the phase in which subjects are still in the domain of losses, as 16 incorporated in DEPOSIT, will lead subjects to continue longer with therapy compared to the 17 baseline treatment. 18
In COPAYMENT, we reduced the expected costs of playing lottery B in periods where subjects 19 have compensated all their previous losses. Figure 3 shows that persistence behavior in BASE 20 and COPAYMENT is almost equally high up to period 8. As predicted by the value function, 21 subjects having now offset their losses, value future gains of continuing with therapy to a lower 22 extent and start switching to the more risky lottery A. However, this decline in persistence in 23 the second half of the decision sequence is steeper in BASE than in COPAYMENT. Hence, the 24 cost intervention in COPAYMENT led a higher proportion of subjects to weigh the benefits 25 over costs in favor of lottery B and, with regard to the complete investment plan, to a significant 26 increase in persistence compared with BASE (Log-Rank Test Chi Square value: 3.81, 1-sided, 1 p=0.025). 2
In the last financial incentive scheme, BONUS, we provide a bonus payment to the subjects 3 after each third period. BONUS is designed to narrow down the possible choice set, thus leading 4 subjects to take decisions more aligned with rational choice theory. 
Cost Effectiveness of the Different Financial Incentive Schemes 21
We analyze the cost effectiveness of the different financial incentive schemes by evaluating 22 how many periods more subjects complied compared with BASE and how much money in turn 23 was additionally paid to them. We only include those subjects of whom we have complete data, 24 so that the analysis represents a lower bound. For BASE and the single financial interventions, 25 Figure 5 shows the distribution of periods up to which the subjects were persistent by choosing 26 lottery B constantly before switching to lottery A. In all financial intervention treatments, the 27 median subject was persistent until period 10 which is one period more than in BASE. In line 1 with the findings from the persistence curve analysis, the greater dispersion of persistent periods 2 in DEPOSIT and BONUS makes this difference statistically zero. When inspecting payments 3 to subjects as a measure for costs, we paid subjects in DEPOSIT on average 1% less and in 4 BONUS on average 10% more than in BASE. For BONUS, this markup in subjects' payments 5 appears to be a bad investment, seen as the same persistence rates, yet with higher costs, are 6 observed. In COPAYMENT, direct payments to subjects are roughly 9% more than in BASE. 7
In contrast to BONUS, these additional costs are profitable in terms of additional persistent 8 periods. From Figure 5 and the results of the previous section, it becomes evident that the 9 distribution of persistent periods in COPAYMENT is skewed to the left, meaning that more 10 persistent periods are at the end of the decision sequence. Hence, we have strong indication that 11 subjects are persistent on average one additional period more than in BASE which amounts to 12 a relative increase of 9%. 13 
Effect of Risk Preferences on Choice Behavior 19
As discussed in the experimental procedure, individual risk preferences were elicited by the 20 lottery choice framework of Dohmen et al. (2010) . In each session, we paid two randomly 21 chosen subjects according to one randomly chosen row of their lottery table in order to provide 22 incentives for truthfully reporting individual risk preferences. The row of the table, in which 23 subjects switch from the 50%-chance lottery to the safe option, proxies the subjects' willingness 24 to take risks. The later the switching point, the more risk seeking the subject is. Similar to the 25 analysis of the main experiment, we only include subjects who have at most one switching point 26 in the table and thus monotonic risk preferences. As can be seen from Table 2 , more than 96% 1 of the subjects have at most only one switching point in the lottery table. Following the 2 literature, we categorize subjects according to their switching point into four risk categories 3 ranging from risk-averse, slightly risk-averse, risk neutral to risk-seeking. By using maximum 4 likelihood estimation to derive the individual's degree of risk aversion, we ensure that our 5 grouping is in line with similar studies using this or related lottery choice frameworks (for 6 details see [63, 69] ). Table 2 shows the results of our grouping procedure. In line with the 7 literature, the estimated r-value, which captures the degree of risk-aversion, allowed 8 categorizing the subjects seen in the table so that we are confident that our sorting procedure is 9 valid. We pool the data over risk preferences because there is no significant difference in the 10 distribution of risk categories across each experimental treatment (Jonckheere-Terpstra Test J-11 value: -1.124, 2-sided, p=0.2612). 12 13 In analogy with the previous analysis, we restrict our sample to those subjects of whom we have 17 complete data in the main experiment and investigate whether the timing of switching from 18 lottery B to lottery A is related to the degree of risk aversion. In fact, we find that subjects who 19 exhibit more risk aversion choose more often lottery B as safer option in the decision sequence 20 compared with those subjects who are more risk-seeking and tend to switch earlier to the more 21 risky lottery A (J-T Test J-value: -1.768, 1-sided, p=0.039). Thus, we find support for our 22 hypothesis that risk preferences matter when making decisions under risk and uncertainty in 23 this experimental setting, as observed persistence behavior is consistent with the underlying 24 individual risk profile. 25
Discussion 1
The current study uses the procedure of behavioral economic engineering to develop and test 2 three different financial incentive schemes aimed at improving persistence behavior. Drawing 3 on theories from behavioral economics and the conceptual framework of medical non-4 persistence, loss aversion and the evaluation of future utility gains relative to a reference point 5 are decisive for the individual decision to discontinue with therapy. Based on this knowledge, 6 three financial incentive schemes grounded in concepts of mental accounting, prospect theory 7 and choice bracketing are elaborated. Subsequently, their effectiveness on changing medication 8 taking behavior is investigated under the same controlled experimental conditions, allowing for 9 clear causal inferences on observed behavior. We design a randomized laboratory experiment 10 in which participants decide in analogy to an investment plan between persistence and non-11 persistence. The economic consequences as trade-off between benefits and costs for persistence 12 behavior and the entailed risks of suffering a medical relapse are modeled as monetary lotteries 13 which participants are asked to choose between in each period. 14 We find that a financial incentive scheme based on prospect theory significantly increases 15 persistence behavior. By lowering the costs of persistence in situations in which losses have 16 been compensated, the economic gain of being persistent remains attractive and leads subjects 17 to significantly continue longer with therapy compared to the baseline experiment with no 18 incentives at all. Referring to medical treatments, this finding implies that an incentive program 19 of lowering copayments of the medicine prescribed to the patients during the course of the 20 treatment is an effective way in improving persistence behavior. Most co-payment support is 21 currently provided during the domain of losses (treatment initiation) and co-payments often 22 peak during the course of the therapy in periods where subjects have compensated their previous 23 losses, e.g. as in the "donut hole". 24
In contrast to these results, we do not find any change in persistence when we use a deposit 1 contract to increase loss aversion in the beginning of a treatment or through the use of a bonus 2 system aimed at enhancing rational choice behavior. Behavioral deposits and bonuses represent 3 a widely used incentive type to influence medication taking behavior and patient health 4 behavior. 5
The present study is of course limited in its scope and institutional environment. In addition to 6 the need for more evaluations of other financial incentive schemes, a further interesting and 7 important aspect would be to investigate how strong patients react when once-established 8 financial incentives are withdrawn during the course of the treatment. This behavioral pattern 9 would certainly be very informative for the debate about short vs. long-term effects of financial 10 incentives. As risk preferences play an important role in the decision-making process continue 11 or discontinue with therapy, patients' personal attributes and other potential covariates such as 12 to measure income-related inequality in health connects with people's preferences about 5 distributions of income and health. They explore the principles of the concentration index by 6 using an economic laboratory experiment with a Dutch student sample. The authors find that 7 socio-demographic characteristics do not have any impact on the results leading to the 8 interpretation that studying the validity of principles of income-related health transfers does not 9 depend on the sample to be used. 10
A scalable way of designing, calibrating and testing behavioral incentives has to be found for 11 broad application in real world which minimizes or completely avoids the need for patient 12 research as ineffective behavioral incentives would potentially negatively impact the utilization 13 of important medication. The results of such research would provide us the components of a 14 screening device which integrates patient characteristics along with situational factors (i.e. the 15 type of disease) and personal judgment biases (i.e. the correct risk assessment for non-16 persistence behavior) to clearly estimate the individual hazard of medical non-persistence 17 under economic conditions. 18
Clinical pilots can then be implemented in such a way that at the start of a medical treatment 19 the best performing financial incentive scheme from laboratory studies is selected. As the 20 effectiveness of these schemes is expected to work the strongest, the obtained results will clarify 21 the role of financial incentives in serving as realizable interventions to successfully combat 22 medical non-persistence. 23
Conclusion
Increasing healthcare delivery efficiency and effectiveness is a major public health need in 1 almost all health systems. Improvements are seen as not only being driven by new clinical 2 science, but by scalable and efficient ways to drive behavioral change. Behavioral Economic 3
Engineering built on principles of behavioral economics and behavioral laboratory experiments 4 could finally unlock the treatment persistence dividend and provide a scalable way of designing, 5 calibrating and testing tailored and effective behavioral incentives. Note: 13 out of 322 subjects were excluded from the analysis because their switching behavior seems to be random. paid to subjects in periods 3, 6, 9 and 12 of BONUS irrespective of the chosen lottery if subjects have not been already dropped out of the experiment. As can be seen by the numbers the dominating strategy to maximize expected utility in each of the three intervention treatments is to chose lottery B until the second last period and only switch to lottery A in the very last period.  Your payment is in no stage of the experiment dependent on the decisions of the other participants.  At the end of the experiment we would like you to fill out a questionnaire. For this you will get a short set of instructions as soon as the experiment has ended. The answers in this questionnaire do not influence your payment you will receive from this experiment.  Playing lottery A, you have the possibility to win 2 Talers with a probability of 70% and 0 Talers with a probability of 30%.  Playing lottery B, you have the possibility to win 2 Talers with a probability of 95% and 0 Talers with a probability of 5%.  You will not be allowed to participate in any of the following periods, should you in any period win 0 Talers in the chosen lottery.  In order to play the Lottery B, you must pay a fee of 1 Taler.  As soon as you have chosen a lottery in one period, it is played as follows:
Stage I -
o 20 sliders will appear on the screen. o In lottery A, 14 of the 20 sliders (70%) lead to a profit of 2 Talers, if they are positioned on the target position of 50. The 14 out of the 20 sliders which lead to a profit of 2 Talers are determined by chance. It is your task to position exactly one slider of all 20 sliders on the target position of 50. If you hit one of the 14 sliders, which lead to a profit of 2 Talers, these will be added to your account. In the case you do not hit any of the 14 sliders, you will not be given any Talers, in addition to not being allowed to take part in any lottery in any following period. o In lottery B, 19 of the 20 sliders (95%) lead to a profit of 2 Talers, if they are positioned on the target position of 50. The 19 out of the 20 sliders which lead to a gain of 2 Talers are determined by chance. It is your task to position exactly one slider of all 20 sliders on the target position of 50. If you hit one of the 19 sliders, which lead to a profit of 2 Talers, these will be added to your account. In the case you do not hit any of the 19 sliders, you will not be given any Talers, in addition to not being allowed to take part in any lottery in any following period.
 If you win 2 Talers in the lottery A or the lottery B, you once again have the chance to choose between one of the lotteries A or B in the next period. The sliders which lead to the gaining of 2 Talers in either lottery A or B are again determined by chance in the next period. The 2 Talers are then again credited to your account.  If you win 0 Talers in one period, you are automatically forwarded to a user interface for all the following periods. Here, you will be asked to make some estimations for which you will not get any money. In addition, you are not allowed to take part in any lottery of the following periods. The credit you have earned will remain unchanged for all the following periods.  After every period you will be informed about your current amount of credit.
Payments:
 At the end of the experiment, your credit will be exchanged at an exchange rate of 1.50 Euro per 1 Taler. A show-up fee of 2.50 Euro is added to this amount which is then directly paid out to you in cash.
Please note:
 During the entire experiment, any form of communication is not permitted.  All mobile phones must be switched off during the complete duration of the experiment.  The decisions you make within this experiment are anonymous, i.e. none of the other participants gets to know the identity of a person who has made a specific decision.  The payments are also handled anonymously. No other participant finds out how much money other participants are paid.
 Please remain seated until the end of the experiment. You will be called forward for your payment through your seat number.
Good luck and thank you for your participation in this experiment! C2: Instructions of the experimental treatments DEPOSIT,COPAYMENT and BONUS 1 (translated from German)
 For the course of the experiment, all amounts of money will be stated in the fictive currency "Taler".  The experiment consists of two stages.  Your payment is in no stage of the experiment dependent on the decisions of the other participants.  At the end of the experiment we would like you to fill out a questionnaire. For this you will get a short set of instructions as soon as the experiment has ended. The answers in this questionnaire do not influence your payment you will receive from this experiment.  Playing lottery A, you have the possibility to win 2 Taler with a probability of 70%
and 0 Taler with a probability of 30%.  Playing lottery B, you have the possibility to win 2 Taler with a probability of 95% and 0 Taler with a probability of 5%.  You will not be allowed to participate in any of the following periods, should you in any period win 0 Taler in the chosen lottery. DEPOSIT:{  In order to play the Lottery B, you must pay a fee of 1 Taler  Independent of your choice of lottery, a participation fee of 0.5 Taler will be charged in each of the periods 1 up to and including 6. This fee is automatically deducted from your account in each period.  Independent of your choice of lottery, this participation fee of 0.5 Taler will be added back to your account in each of the periods 7 up to and including 12.  The deduction of the participation fee of 0.5 Taler from your account in periods 1 to 6 only occurs, if you are still allowed to participate in the lottery of the respective period.  The repayment of the participation fee of 0.5 Taler to your account in periods 7 to 12 only occurs, if you are still allowed to participate in the lottery of the respective period.} COPAYMENT:{  In order to play the Lottery B in the periods 1 up to and including 6, you must pay a fee of 1 Taler.
 In the periods 7 up to and including 12, the fee, that must be paid in order to play the Lottery B, will be reduced by 20%. Thus, in order to play the Lottery B in the periods 7 up to and including 12, you must pay a fee of 0.8 Taler.} BONUS:{  In order to play the Lottery B, you must pay a fee of 1 Taler.  Independent of your choice of lottery, a bonus of 0.5 Taler will be credited to your account after each third period.  This bonus will only be credited to your account in periods 3, 6, 9, and 12 respectively, if you are still allowed to participate in the lottery of the respective period.}  As soon as you have chosen a lottery in one period, it is played as follows:
o 20 sliders will appear on the screen. o In lottery A, 14 of the 20 sliders (70%) lead to a profit of 2 Taler, if they are positioned on the target position of 50. The 14 out of the 20 sliders which lead to a profit of 2 Taler are determined by chance. It is your task to position exactly one slider of all 20 sliders on the target position of 50. If you hit one of the 14 sliders, which lead to a profit of 2 Taler, these will be added to your account. In the case you do not hit any of the 14 sliders, you will not be given any Taler, in addition to not being allowed to take part in any lottery in any following period. for all the following periods. Here, you will be asked to make some estimations for which you will not receive any money. In addition, you are not allowed to take part in any lottery of the following periods. DEPOSIT:{ In all remaining periods, the participation fee of 0.5 Taler is neither deducted from, nor repaid to your account. The credit you have earned will remain unchanged for all the following periods.} COPAYMENT:{ The credit you have earned will remain unchanged for all the following periods.} BONUS: {
